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M any	 contemporary	 theorists	 charge	 that	 naïve	 realists	 are	incapable	of	accounting	for	illusions.	Various	sophisticated	proposals	have	been	ventured	to	meet	this	charge.	Here,	we	
take	a	different	approach	and	dispute	whether	the	naïve	realist	owes	
any	distinctive	account	of	illusion.	To	this	end,	we	begin	with	a	sim-
ple,	naïve	account	of	veridical	perception.	We	then	examine	the	case	
that	 this	account	cannot	be	extended	 to	 illusions.	By	 reconstructing	
an	 explicit	 version	 of	 this	 argument,	we	 show	 that	 it	 depends	 criti-
cally	on	the	contention	that	perceptual	experience	is	diaphanous,	or	
more	minimally	and	precisely,	that	there	can	be	no	difference	in	phe-
nomenal	properties	between	two	experiences	without	a	difference	in	
the	scenes	presented	in	those	experiences.	Finding	no	good	reason	to	
accept	this	claim,	we	develop	and	defend	a	simple,	naïve	account	of	
both	veridical	perception	and	illusion,	here	dubbed	Simple,	Austere	
Naïve	Realism.
1. Naïve Realism
Naïve	realism	is	the	view	that	the	conscious	character	of	experience	
in	genuine	cases	of	perception	is	constituted,	at	least	in	part,	by	non-
representational	perceptual	relations	between	subjects	and	aspects	of	
the	mind-independent	world.	On	this	view,	aspects	of	mind-indepen-
dent	 reality	 are	 presented	 in	 experience,	 and	 thereby	 constitutively	
shape	 the	 contours	of	 consciousness	 (Martin	 1997,	 2004,	 Fish	 2009,	
Kalderon	2015).
Prescinding	 from	any	epistemic	 connotations,	 call	 the	 relation	at	
the	heart	of	the	naïve	realist	account	conscious acquaintance	(Campbell	
2002,	Fish	2009,	Brewer	2011,	Soteriou	2013).	And	call	those	entities	
with	 which	 we	 are	 acquainted	 the	 presented elements	 of	 experience	
(Martin	1998).	We’ll	talk	mainly	of	objects	and	their	features,	but	pre-
sented	elements	evidently	include	entities	of	other	sorts	(e.g.	events).1 
The	naïve	realist	makes	two	key	claims	about	such	elements.	First,	that	
they	include	mind-independent	entities.	Second,	that	being	literal	con-
stituents	of	experience,	such	elements	must	actually	exist	for	a	subject	
1.	 See	Johnston	(2011:	174ff)	for	an	initial	catalogue.
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Principle	(Robinson	1994:	32)		is	rejected	by	both	naïve	realists	and	
their	contemporary	intentionalist	rivals.
To	understand	(A)’s	appeal,	we	need	to	look	instead	to	more	recent	
literature.	To	this	end,	consider	two	examples	of	 illusions	as	usually	
conceived	 by	 philosophers:	 perceptual	 experiences	 wherein	 a	 per-
ceived	object	appears	other	than	it	is.2
Car Case: S	sees	a	red	car	under	streetlights;	it	looks	or-
ange	to	her	(Fish	2009:	150).
Window Case: S	sees	a	rectangular	window	on	the	fourth	
floor	of	a	building;	from	street	level,	it	looks	square	to	her	
(ibid:	159).
Before	considering	these	examples,	let	us	ask	what	a	simple,	naïve	re-
alist	account	of	ordinary	veridical	perception	must	minimally	involve.	
Suppose	S	sees	a	red	car	and	it	looks	red	to	her.	Here	the	naïve	realist	
can	simply	appeal	to	the	car	and	its	redness	to	account	for	the	expe-
rience.	More	generally,	 in	 such	ordinary	 cases,	 the	naïve	 realist	has	
no	need	to	appeal	 to	presented	elements	other	 than	ordinary,	mind-
independent	objects	(e.g.	cars,	windows)	and	their	basic	visible	quali-
ties	(e.g.	colors,	shapes,	and	sizes).	Doubtless,	natural	scenes	contain	
many	 interrelated	 such	elements.	And	 these	elements	are	quite	het-
erogeneous	(think	of	flashes,	mists,	and	shadows).	However,	the	claim	
here	is	not	that	presented	elements	are	all	of	a	piece	(“moderate-sized	
specimens	of	dry	goods”),	but	rather	that	those	required	to	account	for	
ordinary	cases	of	perception	are	confined	to	familiar	elements	of	our	
environments	and	their	familiar	visible	features.
Suppose	this	is	right.	Then	the	most	minimal	naïve	realist	account	
of	illusion holds	that	only	the	very	same	elements	required	to	account	
for	 ordinary	 veridical	 cases	 are	 needed:	 familiar	mind-independent	
objects	 and	 their	 basic	 visible	 properties.3	 In	 particular,	 no	 appeal	
2.	 Not	all	 illusions	fit	 this	mould	(Johnston	2006,	and	Batty	and	Macpherson	
2016).
3.	 A	model	for	us	here	is	Martin’s	“parsimonious	view	of	looks”	which	“proposes	
to	be	in	a	state	of	that	fundamental	kind	(Martin	2006).	The	objects	of	
experience	in	cases	of	genuine	perception	thus	contrast	with	the	ob-
jects	of	thought,	imagination,	and	memory.	More	will	be	said.	First,	we	
consider	why	illusions	are	so	widely	thought	to	thwart	naïve	realism.
2. The Problem of Illusion
The	problem	of	illusion	for	naïve	realism	runs	as	follows:
(A)	Naïve	realism	fails	for	(certain)	illusory	experiences.
(B)	The	same	account	must	be	given	of	all	perceptual	ex-
periences	as	of	illusory	experiences.
(C)	Naïve	realism	fails	for	all	perceptual	experiences.
(A)	 is	an	instance	of	what	Snowdon	(1992:	68)	calls	 the	“Base	Case”,	
where	a	negative	claim	is	made	about	a	certain	sort	of	case		here,	
(certain)	 illusions.	 (B)	 is	 an	 instance	 of	 what	 Snowdon	 calls	 the	
“spreading	step”,	where	 the	Base	Case	claim	 is	generalized.	Here	we	
focus	just	on	(A).	What	argument	can	be	given	for	(A)?
One	obvious	candidate	is	the	first	part	of	the	traditional	argument	
from	illusion:
i.	 In	 an	 illusory	 experience,	 it	 seems	 to	 one	 that	 some-
thing	has	a	quality, F,	which	the	ordinary	object	suppos-
edly	being	perceived	does	not	actually	have.
ii.	When	it	seems	to	one	that	something	has	a	quality, F, 
then	 there	 is	 something	 of	 which	 one	 is	 aware	 which	
does	have	this	quality.
iii.	Since	the	ordinary	object	in	question	is,	by	hypothesis,	
not-F,	then	it	follows	that	in	cases	of	illusory	experience,	
one	is	not	aware	of	the	object	after	all.	(Crane	and	French	
2016)
This	argument	will	not	help	us	here.	Not	only	is	it	invalid	(French	and	
Walters	 2018),	 but	 its	 second	 premise		 the	 so-called	 Phenomenal	
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Proponents	and	opponents	of	naïve	realism	alike	either	quickly	re-
ject	or	simply	fail	to	consider	this	approach.	Proponents	of	naïve	real-
ism	typically	formulate	some	alternative	account	of	 illusions	instead	
(e.g.	 Fish	2009,	Kalderon	2011,	Genone	2014).	 In	 so	doing,	 they	 im-
plicitly	or	explicitly	concur	with	their	opponents	that	Simple,	Austere	
Naïve	Realism	is	untenable	(e.g.	Foster	2000,	Smith	2010,	Block	2010).	
In	the	next	section,	we	reconstruct	an	explicit	version	of	the	underly-
ing	argument	against	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism.	By	doing	so,	we	
expose	how	 it	depends	critically	on	 the	assumption	 that	perceptual	
experience	is	diaphanous,	or	more	minimally	and	precisely,	that	there	
can	be	no	difference	 in	phenomenal	properties	between	two	experi-
ences	without	a	difference	in	the	scenes	presented	in	those	experienc-
es.	Call	this	the	Difference	Principle.	In	section	four,	we	examine	how	
the	Difference	Principle	has	forced	naïve	realists	to	elaborate	accounts	
of	illusion	which	reject	one	or	both	elements	of	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	
Realism.	In	section	five,	we	explain	how	rejecting	the	Difference	Prin-
ciple	frees	the	naïve	realist	to	embrace	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism.	
Finally,	in	section	six,	we	reply	to	three	arguments	for	the	Difference	
Principle.
3. Exposing the Difference Principle
A.	D.	Smith	presents	the	core	objection	to	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Real-
ism	as	follows:
Consider	…	a	case	where	a	green	square	looks	yellow	to	
me,	 though	 it	 does	 look	 square.	…	This	 square’s	 shape	
furnishes	 the	 phenomenal	 character	 of	 the	 illusory	 per-
ception	…	 in	 the	 respect	of	being	as	of	a	 square.	What,	
however,	about	the	apparent	yellowness?	It,	clearly,	must	
be	 accounted	 for	 by	 something	 other	 than	 the	 green	
square	being	a	constituent	of	 the	experience,	since	 this	
is	 the	case	when	a	green	square	veridically	 looks	green	
to	me.	Some	extra,	“bad”	factor,	over	and	above	the	green	
square’s	being	a	constituent,	must,	therefore,	be	attributed	
is	 required	 to	 special	 appearance	 or	 perspectival-properties,	 nor	 to	
sense-data	or	intentional	aspects	of	experience.	Note	that	we	do	not	
suppose	that	an	exhaustive	specification	of	simple	elements	and	basic	
visible	aspects	can	be	given	in	abstract	terms.	Rather,	we	take	it	to	be	
common	knowledge	that	certain	features	can	be	presented	in	ordinary	
veridical	cases	of	perception,	and	deny	that	illusions	require	us	to	rec-
ognize	any	further	elements.
Call	these	two	claims,	respectively,	Simplicity and	Austerity.
Simplicity:	 The	 character-constituting	 presented	 ele-
ments	of	ordinary	veridical	experience	are	just	ordinary	
visible	 features	of	 the	mind-independent	world:	 the	ob-
jects	we	ordinarily	take	ourselves	to	see	and	their	basic	
visible	properties.
Austerity:	Illusions	do	not	differ	from	veridical	cases	(as	
understood	 in	 Simplicity),	 neither	 in	 relational	 nature,	
nor	 in	 the	 kind	 of	 character-constituting	 presented	 ele-
ments	to	which	they	are	relations.
Together,	 these	 claims	 articulate	 Simple, Austere Naïve Realism.	 They	
entail	that	the	same	(and	only	the	same)	simple	presented	elements	
of	mind-independent	reality	which	constitutively	shape	the	contours	
of	conscious	experience	in	veridical	perception	also	do	so	in	cases	of	
illusion.
The	most	straightforward	application	of	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Re-
alism	to	the	examples	above	holds	that	in	Car	Case,	S	 is	acquainted	
with	 the	car	and	 its	 redness,	and	 that	 these	presented	elements	are	
constitutive	of	 character;	and	 that	 in	Window	Case,	S	 is	acquainted	
with	 the	window	and	 its	 rectangularity,	and	 that	 these	presented	el-
ements	are	constitutive	of	character		no	other	novel	or	additional	
presented	elements	are	needed.	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism	thus	
declines	to	offer	any	distinctive	theory	of	illusion.
that	we	identify	the	looks	of	objects	with	their	basic	visible	properties,	includ-
ing	their	colors	and	shapes”	(2010:	161).	
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In	 rejecting	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism,	Smith	 and	Fish	 thus	
assume	that	if	two	experiences	have	different	phenomenal	properties,	
they	must	 have	 different	 character-constituting	 presented	 elements.	
This	critical	assumption	 is	an	aspect	of	a	 thesis	which	Martin	 labels	
“Diaphaneity”,	the	thesis	that	“sameness	and	difference	of	phenomenal	
properties	just	are	sameness	and	difference	in	[character-constituting]	
presented	elements”	(Martin	1998:	175).4
Diaphaneity	entails	two	conditional	principles:
Difference Principle:	Necessarily,	if	two	experiences	dif-
fer	in	phenomenal	character,	then	they	differ	in	character-
constituting	presented	elements.
Sameness Principle:	Necessarily,	if	two	experiences	are	
alike	 in	 phenomenal	 character,	 then	 they	 are	 alike	 in	
character-constituting	presented	elements.
The	Difference	 Principle	will	 be	 our	 focus	 in	what	 follows.	 In	 addi-
tion	to	Smith	and	Fish,	many	other	critics	of	naïve	realism	endorse	the	
principle.	Foster	assumes	it	when	he	argues	that	the	mere	existence	
of	 “cases	 of	 non-veridical	 perception	 immediately	 establishes	 that	
[naïve	realism],	as	a	general	theory	of	perception,	is	mistaken”	on	the	
grounds	that	naïve	realism	guarantees	“full	veridicality”	and	“leaves	no	
room	for	cases	in	which	…	how	things	sensibly	appear	…	is	at	variance	
with	the	character	of	the	perceived	item”	(2000:	64).	Likewise,	Block’s	
argument	 against	 naïve	 realism	 “based	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 [in	 special	
experimental	contexts]	…	there	can	be	more	 than	one	phenomenal	
character	 of	 experience	 of	 the	 same	 instantiated	 properties,	 even	 if	
nothing	about	the	environment	or	the	non-mental	relations	between	
the	subject	and	the	environment	differs”	 (2010:	49−50)	 lapses	 if	 the	
4.	 Martin	 cites	 Price	 1932.	 Theorists	 (e.g.	 Block	 2010)	 sometimes	 talk	 about	
“Moorean	 Diaphaneity”	 following	 Moore	 1953.	 Diaphaneity	 should	 not	 be	
conflated	with	transparency.	As	we	discuss	in	§6,	perceptual	experience	may	
be	transparent	(in	that	introspection	of	such	experience	inevitably	involves	
attention	to	presented	elements)	without	being	diaphanous.	As	a	result,	there	
is	no	reason	that	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism	should	not	partly	be	moti-
vated	by	appeal	to	transparency	(Martin	2002).
to	this	partially	illusory	state	to	account	for	the	illusorily	
appearing	colour:	something	that	is	absent	in	the	case	of	
completely	 veridical	 perception,	 where	 the	 constituent	
object	itself	does	all	the	work.	(2010:	388–389)
Smith	 imagines	 two	 cases:	 a	 veridical	 perception	of	 a	 green	 square	
which	looks	green	to	him;	and	an	illusory	perception	of	a	green	square	
which	looks	yellow	to	him.	Can	an	account	of	the	illusory	case	be	giv-
en	in	terms	of	a	green	square	being	a	constituent	of	the	experience,	as	
Austerity	would	have	it?	Smith	thinks	“clearly”	not,	because	that	is	the	
account	of	the	veridical	case.	Presumably,	his	thought	is	that	if	the	il-
lusory	case	shared	its	presented	elements	with	the	veridical	case,	then	
the	two	cases	would	have	the	same	color	character,	which	evidently	
they	do	not.
Fish	articulates	the	core	objection	even	more	explicitly.	He	again	
compares	two	cases:	a	veridical	experience	of	a	red	car	looking	red	to	
S;	and	an	illusory	experience	of	the	same	red	car	looking	orange	to	S 
(Car	Case	above).	Fish	then	poses	a	dilemma	for	the	naïve	realist	which	
divides	over	whether	they	treat	both	cases	as	involving	acquaintance	
with	the	car’s	being	red.	If	they	do,	Fish	claims	that	both	will	have	to	be	
alike	in	color	phenomenology,	when	evidently	they	are	not.	If	they	do	
not,	 then	 they	appear	 to	have	no	alternative	acquaintance-with-con-
crete-facts	(i.e.	Fish-style	naïve	realist)	story	to	tell.	“Either	way,”	Fish	
concludes,	“there	looks	to	be	no	way	of	supplying	the	illusory	experi-
ence	with	an	alternative	phenomenal	property	with	which	to	account	
for	the	difference	in	what	it	is	like	to	have	the	illusory	experience	of	
the	relevant	feature”	(2009:	150–151).
Fish	 seizes	 the	 second	horn	 of	 the	 dilemma,	 developing	 a	more	
sophisticated	 acquaintance-with-concrete-facts	 story	 for	 the	 illusory	
case	(see	below).	However,	our	present	interest	is	why	Fish	thinks	that	
Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism	fails.	What	we	are	given	is	this:	If	Sim-
ple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism	is	true,	then	the	veridical	and	illusory	car	
experiences	must	have	the	same	color	phenomenal	properties.	Since	
they	don’t,	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism	is	false.
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ordinary	visible	features	of	the	mind-independent	world:	
the	objects	we	ordinarily	take	ourselves	to	see	and	their	
basic	visible	properties.
(7)	In	C
1
,	the	relevant	character-constituting	presented	el-
ements	are	simply	O	and	its	F-ness.
(8)	It’s	not	the	case	that,	in	C
2
,	the	relevant	character-con-
stituting	presented	elements	are	simply	O	and	its	F-ness.
(9)	Austerity:	Illusions	do	not	differ	from	veridical	cases	
(as	understood	in	Simplicity),	neither	in	relational	nature	
nor	 in	 the	 kind	 of	 character-constituting	 presented	 ele-
ments	to	which	they	are	relations.
(10)	 The	 only	 relevant	 character-constituting	 presented	
elements	of	the	same	kind	as	those	required	to	account	
for	ordinary	cases	of	veridical	perception	which	are	pres-
ent	in	C
2
	are	O and	its	F-ness.
(11)	 In	C
2
,	 the	 relevant	 character-constituting	 presented	
elements	are	simply	O	and	its	F-ness.
CONTRADICTION
To	apply	the	argument	to	Car	Case,	we	simply	take	C
1
	as	daylight	and	
C
2	
as	streetlight,	and	stipulate	that	no	car-substitute	is	available	to	step	
in	as	a	presented	element	and	that	the	car	is	no	other	color	than	red.
The	Difference	Argument	exposes	a	fundamental	tension	between	
Simplicity,	Austerity,	 and	 the	Difference	Principle.	As	 such,	 it	 repre-
sents	a	significant	step	towards	(A)	above		the	claim	that	naïve	real-
ism	fails	for	(certain)	illusions.	The	argument	does	not	establish	(A).	It	
does	show	that,	given	the	Difference	Principle,	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	
Realism	fails	and	that	 the	naïve	realist	owes	some	other	positive	ac-
count	of	illusions.
In	the	next	section,	we	briefly	review	the	positive	accounts	devel-
oped	by	three	naïve	realists:	Kalderon	(2011),	Fish	(2009),	and	Genone	
Difference	Principle	is	rejected.	Pautz’s	(2017)	critique	that	naïve	real-
ism	is	unable	to	accommodate	phenomenal	differences	arising	from	
differing	 neural	 response	 dispositions	 also	 assumes	 that	 naïve	 real-
ist	phenomenal	 character	 is	grounded	 in	 “nothing	but”	 (24)	 the	pre-
sented	scene.	This	implies	the	Difference	Principle.	Finally,	Brogaard’s	
(2018)	suggestion	that	cases	which	show	that	the	“phenomenology	of	
experience	is	not	exhausted	by	the	external	object	and	its	perceptible	
properties	instances”	(9)	count	against	naïve	realism	also	assumes	the	
Difference	Principle.
With	all	this	in	mind,	we	now	formulate	our	target	argument	against	
Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism.
The Difference Argument
Take	an	object	O,	a	perceiver	S,	and	a	pair	of	perceptual	
contexts	C
1
	and	C
2
.	Suppose	that	O	 instantiates	sensible	
quality	F,	and	consider	G,	where	F	and	G	are	incompatible.
(1)	Let	C
1
	be	an	ordinary	case	of	veridical	perception	 in	
which	S	experiences	O	as	F.
(2)	Let	C
2
	be	a	case	of	illusion	in	which	S	experiences	O 
as	G.
(3)	So	there	is	a	difference	in	phenomenal	properties	be-
tween	the	experience	of	O	in	C
1
	and	the	experience	of	O 
in	C
2
.
(4)	 The	Difference	 Principle:	 Necessarily,	 if	 two	 experi-
ences	differ	in	phenomenal	character,	then	they	differ	in	
character-constituting	presented	elements.
(5)	So	there	 is	a	difference	 in	character-constituting	pre-
sented	elements	between	the	experience	of	O	 in	C
1
	and	
the	experience	of	O	in	C
2
.
(6)	 Simplicity:	 The	 character-constituting	 presented	
elements	 of	 ordinary	 veridical	 experience	 are	 just	
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aspect	of	the	car’s	redness	is	not	selected,	instead	its	red look	is.	Thus,	
prevailing	perceptual	conditions	make	different	looks	available.
Second,	Fish.	Fish	(2009)	thinks	of	perspective	and	perceptual	con-
ditions	not	merely	as	selecting which	features	shape	character,	but	as	
partly	determining	what	 is	 there to	 be	 selected.7 For	 instance,	 in	Car	
Case,	 Fish	 denies	 that	 S	 is	 acquainted	with	 the	 fact	 of	 the	 car’s	 be-
ing	 red.	 Instead,	 S is	 acquainted	 with	 the	 car’s	 exhibiting	 a	 certain	
(presumably	orange	or	orange-looking)	shade,	where	 this	 shade	 is	a	
relational	property	determined	partly	by	the	car’s	color	but	partly	by	
relevant	illumination	conditions	(158).8	Since	the	car	has	this	property	
only	 relative	 to	 the	 current	 perceptual	 conditions,	 those	 conditions	
play	a	determinative availability role.
Finally,	Genone	also	endorses	a	determinative	role	for	perceptual	
conditions.	 For	Genone,	 appearances,	whilst	 “entirely	mind-indepen-
dent”	(2014:	357)	properties,	are	distinct	from	the	basic	visible	proper-
ties	of	objects	such	as	their	sizes,	shapes,	and	colors.	Rather,	appear-
ances	 are	 relational	 “properties	 an	object	 has	 in	 a	 given	perceptual	
context”	(366,	fn.	34),	possessed	“in	virtue	of	their	intrinsic	properties	
and	various	environmental	conditions”	(357).	Thus,	 in	Car	Case,	the	
subject	is	aware	of	the	car’s	appearance	(not	its	color)	where	this	is	a	
relational	property	 jointly	determined	by	 its	actual	color	and	the	so-
dium	street-light	context.	The	subject	may	mistakenly	judge	that	the	
car	is	orange	insofar	as	this	appearance	is	indiscriminable	for	the	per-
ceiver	from	the	appearance	of	an	orange	car	in	daylight	(362).9
Despite	 their	 differences,	 Kalderon,	 Fish,	 and	 Genone	 all	 under-
stand	 perspective	 and	 perceptual	 conditions	 to	 play	 an	 availability	
role,	allowing	cases	of	illusion	to	be	handled	in	conformity	with	the	
7.	 Here,	we	focus	just	on	Fish’s	account	of	physical	(as	opposed	to	cognitive	and	
optical)	illusions	(2009:	148–149).
8.	 Despite	ordinary	usage,	“shades”	in	Fish’s	technical	idiolect	are	not	colors	or	
basic	visible	qualities.
9.	 It	is	unclear	whether	on	Genone’s	view	colors	are	ever	seen,	or	merely	known	
(see	2014:	366,	fn.	34).
(2014).	Despite	 their	 various	differences,	we	 show	how	all	 three	 ac-
counts	reject	Austerity,	and	with	it,	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism.
4. Anti-Austerity
To	account	for	the	illusions	under	discussion,	the	naïve	realist	will	nat-
urally	appeal	to	facts	about	the	perceiver’s	perspective	and	perceptual	
conditions.	Thus,	plausibly,	 in	Window	Case,	S sees	 the	 rectangular	
window	as	square	because she is looking at it from a certain point of view, 
and in	Car	Case,	S sees	the	red	car	as	orange	because it is illuminated by 
streetlights. More	generally,	differences	in	character	between	the	kinds	
of	 veridical	 and	 illusory	 pairs	 targeted	 by	 the	Difference	Argument	
arise	because	of	differences	in	perspective	and	perceptual	conditions.
This	Appeal to Perspective doesn’t	tell	us	how	facts	about	perspective	
and	conditions	explain	phenomenal	differences.	Yet	almost	without	
exception,	they	are	taken	to	play	an	availability role:	They	affect	which 
presented	 elements are	 available	 to	 shape	 phenomenal	 character.5 
This	respects	the	Difference	Principle.	However,	because	there	are	no	
differences	in	the	ordinary	objects	and	basic	visible	qualities	present-
ed	across	our	veridical	and	illusory	pairs,	this	way	of	exploiting	the	Ap-
peal to Perspective	means	introducing	additional	non-simple	elements	
in	accounting	 for	 illusions,	and	so	 the	 rejection	of	Austerity.	 If	 such	
additional	elements	are	also	held	to	play	a	role	in	veridical	perceptual	
experiences,	Simplicity,	too,	will	be	rejected.
To	illustrate,	consider	the	accounts	of	three	contemporary	naïve	re-
alists.6	First,	Kalderon.	Kalderon	(2011)	argues	that	in	cases	such	as	Car	
Case,	whilst	the	car’s	redness	is	present	in	experience,	so	is	its	orange 
look.	For	Kalderon,	this	look	is	a	sensible	aspect	of	the	car’s	objective	
color	 (Kalderon	 2008).	 In	 different	 perceptual	 conditions,	 different	
looks	are	available	to	shape	character.	Under	streetlights,	the	car’s	or-
ange look is	selected	and	so	shapes	character.	In	natural	light,	that	same	
5.	 Cf.	Beck	on	“selectionism”	(2019:	610−611).
6.	 We	discuss	Campbell	and	Brewer’s	accounts	in	the	next	section.
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ways those	presented	elements	are	presented.12	To	embrace	such	varia-
tion	is	to	reject	the	Difference	Principle.
We	can	combine	this	idea	with	the	Appeal to Perspective:	Experienc-
es	can	differ	in	character	because	of	differences	in	facts	about	perspec-
tive	 and	 perceptual	 conditions.	 Instead	 of	 understanding	 this	 exclu-
sively	in	terms	of	availability,	however,	the	naïve	realist	can	propose	
that	facts	about	perspective	can	make	a	difference	to	the	way	in	which	
presented	elements	are	presented.	If	so,	experiences	can	differ	in	char-
acter	despite	not	differing	in	presented	elements.
Take	Car	Case.	 In	daylight,	 the	car	 looks	 red	 to	S;	under	sodium	
streetlights,	orange;	and	perhaps,	at	night,	grey.	Despite	this,	nothing	
other	than	the	car	and	its	redness	need	be	presented	to	S.13	For	there	is	
no	unique	way	of	perceiving	these	elements.	The	car	and	its	redness	
can	shape	experiential	character	in	many	different	ways.	There	is	no	
need	to	appeal	to	different	aspects of	redness	to	account	for	the	varia-
tion	(as	in	Kalderon),	or	to	different	relational	“shades”	(as	in	Fish),	or	
to	different	relational	appearances	(as	in	Genone).	Certainly,	there	is	
no	need	for	represented	colors	or	colored	sense-data.
Likewise,	take	Window	Case.	Looked	at	from	one	angle,	the	win-
dow	looks	rectangular	to	S;	from	another	angle,	square;	and	perhaps,	
through	distorting	 lenses,	oval.	Despite	 this,	nothing	other	 than	 the	
window	and	its	rectangularity	need	be	presented	to	S.	For	these	ele-
ments	can	shape	character	in	many	different	ways	according	to	the	dif-
fering	circumstances	of	perception.	Again,	there	is	no	need	to	appeal	
to	 different	 perspectival	 shapes	 or	 relational	 appearances,	 let	 alone	
represented	shapes	or	shaped	sense-data.
In	this	way,	the	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realist	can	reject	the	Differ-
ence	Principle,	and	hence	 the	Difference	Argument.	Against	 it,	 they	
insist	 that	 there	 need	 not	 be	 just	 one	way	 of	 seeing	 a	 given	 scene.	
12.	 A	 similar	 thought	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Soteriou	 (2013:	 25),	 Logue	 (2012:	 222),	
and	Beck	(2019).	Neither	Martin	nor	any	of	these	authors	appeal	to	ways	of	
presentation	in	addressing	arguments	from	illusion	as	we	do	here.	Soteriou	
briefly	mentions	this	option	elsewhere	(2016:	188–191).
13.	 At	least	as	regards	car	and	color.	Features	of	the	surrounding	perceived	cir-
cumstances,	such	as	the	ambient	light,	will	doubtless	vary	across	most	cases.
Difference	 Principle.10	 The	 price	 is	 Austerity.	 For	 differences	 in	 per-
spective	do	not	change	which	ordinary	objects	and	qualities	are	avail-
able	 across	 veridical	 and	 illusory	 pairs.	 Thus,	 additional	 presented	
elements	must	be	introduced:	for	Kalderon,	looks of	objects	or	colors,	
conceived	of	 as	distinct	 from	basic	 visible	qualities	or	 amalgams	of	
such;11	for	Fish,	special	relational	shades	and	perspectival	shapes;	and	
for	 Genone,	 relational,	 context-specific	 appearances.	 The	 common	
consequence	is	the	rejection	of	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism.
In	 the	 next	 section,	 we	 offer	 a	 different	 response	 to	 the	 Differ-
ence	Argument	which	is	fully	consistent	with	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	
Realism.
5. Denying the Difference Principle
The	Difference	Principle	leads	both	naïve	realists	and	their	critics	to	
reject	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism.	Yet	it	is	largely	an	unargued	as-
sumption.	 It	 is	certainly	not,	as	opponents	of	naïve	realism	often	as-
sume	 (e.g.	 Block	 2010:	 29),	 built	 into	 the	 very	 idea	 that	mind-inde-
pendent	entities	are	character-constituting	constituents	of	experience.	
We	now	explain	how	denying	the	Difference	Principle	is	perfectly	co-
herent	 for	 the	naïve	 realist.	We	first	present	our	proposal,	and	 then	
develop	it	by	responding	to	a	series	of	challenges.
In	voicing	skepticism	about	Diaphaneity,	Martin	asks	rhetorically:	
“Why	 cannot	 the	ways	 in	which	 things	 are	 presented	 in	 experience	
make	a	difference	to	what	the	experience	is	like	in	addition	to	what	is	
perceived?”	(1998:	175).	The	idea	is	that	even	holding	fixed	character-
constituting	presented	elements,	experiences	might	still	differ	in	the	
10.	 Fish	explicitly	endorses	 the	Difference	Principle	(2009:	57,	 fn.	4).	Kalderon	
and	Genone	do	not	(though	see	discussion	of	Kalderon	in	§6),	but	their	ac-
counts	of	illusion conform	to	it.
11.	 Kalderon’s	departure	from	Austerity	is	minimal	insofar	as	his	looks	are	aspects 
of	basic	visible	qualities.	However,	they	are	not	simply	identifiable	with	such	
qualities.	Kalderon	rejects	both	Austerity	and	Simplicity	since	such	looks	also	
figure	in	ordinary	veridical	perceptions	on	his	view.
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5.2 Isn’t our view simply a three-place or third-relatum account such as of-
fered by Campbell and Brewer?
The	answer	depends	on	how	exactly	such	views	should	be	understood.	
Consider	 first	 Campbell	 (2009,	 also	 Campbell	 and	 Cassam	 2014).	
Campbell	notes	that	you	can	have	different	experiences	of	a	complex	
shape	 (2009:	 655),	 for	 example	 by	 viewing	 it	 from	different	 angles.	
He	thus	rejects	 the	view	that	 “the	 full	characterization	of	your	expe-
rience	of	shape	is	given	by	saying	that	you	bear	the	generic	relation	
of	consciousness	 to	a	particular	 three-dimensional	shape”	(ibid.).	 In-
stead,	and	like	us,	Campbell	proposes	that	shapes	can	be	experienced	
in	different	ways.	Distinctively,	however,	Campbell	unpacks	this	idea	
by	 analyzing	 experience	 as	 a	 three-place	 relation	 between	 subjects,	
presented	elements,	and	a	third,	perceptual	“standpoint”	relatum.	This	
standpoint	comprises	multifarious	factors,	firstly	the	sense	modality	in	
question,	and	then	corresponding	factors	such	as	the	subject’s	relative	
orientation	and	location.
On	 one	 interpretation,	Campbell’s	 picture	 is	 highly	 congenial	 to	
Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism.	On	this	interpretation,	the	third-rela-
tum	 serves	 to	deny	 that	 there	 is	 a	 function	 (unique	mapping)	 from	
subjects	 and	 presented	 elements	 to	 phenomenal	 characters.	 This	 is	
equivalent	 to	 denying	 the	 Difference	 Principle.	 Campbell	 goes	 be-
yond	 the	mere	denial	 of	 functionality	 in	 articulating	 various	 factors	
which	comprise	the	standpoint.	However,	insofar	as	he	simply	aims	to	
indicate	some	of	the	factors	which	affect	phenomenal	character	over-
and-above	variation	in	presented	elements,	this	is	again	congenial	to	
our	approach.	We	see	no	 reason	 to	endorse	 (nor	attribute	 to	Camp-
bell)	stronger	commitments,	 for	 instance,	 that	we	can	enumerate	all	
possible	standpoint	factors,	or	that	there	exists	any systematic relation	
between	phenomenal	characters	and	standpoints.	On	this	interpreta-
tion,	our	key	contribution	is	to	extend	Campbell’s	account	of	veridical	
perception	to	illusions	about	which	Campbell	is	silent.
Campbell’s	 account	 is	 often	 understood	 in	 a	 quite	 different	way,	
however.	On	this	understanding,	the	third-relatum	plays	an	availabil-
ity	role,	selecting	or	determining	which	worldly	features	are	presented	
Elements	can	be	presented,	and	so	shape	character,	in	many	different	
ways,	 due	 to	 variation	 in	perspectival	 factors.	We	now	develop	 this	
core	claim	via	a	series	of	challenges.
5.1 Doesn’t appealing to ways of perceiving go well beyond Simplicity and 
Austerity?
Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism	has	a	modest,	negative	ambition:	to	es-
chew	any	distinctive	treatment	of	illusions,	and	maintain	that	a	simple	
account	of	veridical	perception	is	already	entirely	adequate.	By	intro-
ducing	ways	of	perceiving	into	our	account	of	illusions,	have	we	aban-
doned	this	ambition?	We	have	not.	Appealing	to	ways	of	perceiving	
does	not	force	the	naïve	realist	to	say	that	illusions	differ	from	veridical	
cases	in	their	relational	nature,	or	in	the	kind	of	presented	elements	
they	involve.	Furthermore,	we	are	not	appealing	to	ways	of	perceiving	
specifically to account for illusions.	Veridical	perceptions	equally	involve	
ways	of	perceiving.	When	S	veridically	perceives	the	red	car,	the	car	
and	 its	 redness	are	not	merely	perceptually	presented	 to	S.	They	are	
perceptually	presented	visually,	from	such-and-such	a	point	of	view,	in	
natural	daylight,	and	so	forth.	Thus,	appealing	to	ways	of	perceiving	in	
illusions	involves	no	distinctive	new	“machinery”.	It	conforms	entirely	
with	the	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realist’s	modest	negative	ambition.
Because	ways	of	perceiving	are	part	of	both	veridical	and	illusory	
cases,	the	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realist	can	also	easily	accommodate	
ordinary,	non-illusory	(constancy-preserving)	cases	of	 intra-individu-
al	variation	 in	appearance.	Similarly,	 they	can	accommodate	Block’s	
claim	that	due	to	normal	variation	of	the	visual	system	(e.g.	peak	cone	
sensitivity	 and	macular	 pigmentation),	 “any	 [color]	 chip	 is	 likely	 to	
look	different	 to	different	people,	especially	 those	who	differ	 in	 sex,	
race	or	age”	(1999:	44;	cf.	Pautz	2017	and	Brogaard	2018:	87−92).	Block	
exploits	this	fact	to	argue	against	representationalism	and	in	favor	of	
qualia.	We	take	such	data	rather	to	show	that	structural	differences	in	
the	visual	system	can	lead	to	different	ways	of	veridically	perceiving	
identical	 presented	 elements,	 allowing	 for	 inter-individual	 phenom-
enological	variation	despite	sameness	in	presented	elements.
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interpretation,	 these	properties	 are	what	Brewer	 calls	 looks.	So	 con-
strued,	Brewer’s	view	can	be	considered	a	version	of	Simple,	Austere	
Naïve	Realism.15
Our	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realist	approach	thus	aligns	well	with	
existing	three-place	naïve	realist	views	on a certain minimal interpreta-
tion of them.	Indeed,	minimally	interpreted,	we	do	not	consider	there	
to	 be	 any	 substantive	 difference	 between	 treating	 perception	 as	 a	
single	three-place	relation	holding	between	subjects,	standpoints,	and	
presented	elements,	or	as	a	multiply	determinable	two-place	relation	
holding	 between	 subjects	 and	 presented	 elements.	 On	 both	 treat-
ments,	 there	 is	 no	 function	 from	 presented	 elements	 to	 conscious	
perceptual	 characters.	And	on	neither	 view	do	 standpoints	 or	ways	
number	amongst	the	presented	elements	of	perception.	Nonetheless,	
given	 the	evident	confusion	and	obscurity	surrounding	 the	 interpre-
tation	of	 three-place	views,	we	avoid	 framing	our	own	view	in	such	
terms.
5.3 Isn’t our view just a form of adverbialism?
The	adverbialist	holds	that	“having	a	visual	experience	is	a	matter	of	
sensing	in	a	certain	manner”	(Tye	1984:	195–196).	This	provides	them	
with	a	simple	account	of	 illusions.	Of	Car	Case,	 for	 instance,	the	ad-
verbialist	will	hold	that	even	though	there	is	nothing	orange	perceptu-
ally	presented	to	S, S	“senses	orangely”		that	is,	senses	in	an	orange	
manner	or	way		 and	 this	 is	what	accounts	 for	 the	character	of	S’s	
experience.
Our	approach	differs	from	the	adverbialist	approach	in	two	impor-
tant	respects.	First,	the	adverbialist	denies	that	S	senses	the car	or	the 
car’s redness,	and	senses	it orangely.	The	adverbialist	holds	merely	that	
15.	 This	interpretation	fits	better	with	Brewer’s	treatment	of	his	third-relatum	as	a	
constitutive	aspect	of	perceptual	experience	(2011:	100,	fn.	5).	If	the	third-rela-
tum	played	an	availability	role,	a	constitutive	treatment	would	be	puzzling.	
The	relatum	would	be	constitutive	of	a	certain	relational	property,	but	unless	
constitution	were	transitive,	this	would	not	suffice	to	make	it	constitutive	of	
experience	itself.	 In	contrast,	 if	 the	third-relatum	marks	an	ineliminable	ad-
ditional	dimension	of	variation	 in	 the	phenomenal	nature	of	acquaintance,	
then	it	makes	sense	to	conceive	of	it	constitutively.
from	occasion	to	occasion.	Thus,	Pautz	(citing	Campbell	and	Cassam	
2014:	28)	claims	that	Campbell’s	standpoint	relatum	“is	just	a	matter	
of	which	external	states	in	the	scene	you	are	acquainted	with”	(2017:	
24).	Similarly,	Genone	offers	his	Difference	Principle-conforming	ac-
count	 (discussed	 above)	 as	 a	 development	 of	 Campbell’s	 approach	
(2014:	351),	construing	Campbell’s	standpoint	as	partially	determining	
which	relational	appearance	properties	are	perceptually	available.	We	
reject	such	three-place	accounts	given	their	conformity	to	the	Differ-
ence	Principle.
Brewer	also	proposes	a	three-place	analysis	of	perceptual	acquain-
tance	(e.g.	2011:	96),	which	he	does	extend	to	illusions.	To	illustrate	his	
approach,	recall	Car	Case.	On	Brewer’s	picture,	relevant	perspectival	
factors,	here	saliently	the	street-lighting,	constitute	a	third-relatum	of	
the	perceptual	 relation	 in	addition	 to	subject	and	presented	objects.	
Relative	 to	 this	 third-relatum,	 Brewer	 holds	 that	 the	 car	 is	 visually	
similar	to	a	paradigm	orange	object.	This	grounds	the	car’s	possession	
of	an	orange	look.	This	look	is	not	a	basic	visible	quality,	but	rather	a	
special	—	albeit	 perfectly	 objective	—	feature	 that	 the	 car	 has	 in	 rela-
tion	 to	 the	 street-lighting.	 Again,	 there	 are	 different	ways	 of	 under-
standing	this	proposal.	It	is	natural	to	think	that	we	can	be	presented	
with	the	looks	of	things	(“Did	you	see	the	look	on	his	face?”)	and	so	
to	number	Brewer’s	looks	alongside	ordinary	objects	and	their	basic	
visible	features	as	presented	elements	available	to	shape	experiential	
character.	To	do	so	is	to	assign	a	determinative	availability	role	to	the	
third-relatum	in	the	manner	of	Genone’s	approach	discussed	above.
There	 is,	however,	an	alternative	understanding	of	Brewer’s	view	
on	which	 looks	are	not	 themselves	presented	elements.14	Rather,	 as	
on	our	view,	presented	elements	are	presented	in	particular	ways	de-
pending	on	 the	 circumstances	of	 perception.	Relative	 to	 some	 such	
set	 of	 circumstances,	 a	 given	 element	has	 the	 objective	 property	 of	
being	 such	 as	 to	 present	 itself	 perceptually	 in	 a	 given	way.	On	 this	
14.	 Indeed,	in	his	early	writings	on	the	Object	View	(e.g.	2011:	6),	presented	ele-
ments	seem	restricted	entirely	to	physical	objects.	However,	Brewer	(2018b:	
20)	now	explicitly	admits	basic	visible	features.
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Contra	(1),	we	deny	that	ways	of	perceiving	are	specifiable	in	terms	
of	perceptible	qualities.	Contra	(2),	we	deny	that	ways	of	perceiving	
make	a	wholly	 independent	and	 separable	 contribution	 to	phenom-
enology.	Ways	of	perceiving	in	our	sense	cannot	account	for	the	phe-
nomenology	of	hallucination	in	the	way	that	Beck	takes	them	to.17	The	
way	of	perceiving	 in	Car	Case,	associated	with	perceiving	under	 so-
dium	streetlights,	cannot	be	 lifted	out	of	 that	context	 to	account	 for	
a	hallucination	as	of	something	orange.	It	is	not	a	matter	of	“perceiv-
ing	orangely”	or	“being	appeared	to	in	an	orangeish	way”.	Insofar	as	it	
helps	to	explain	why	things	look	orange	to	S,	this	is	not independent	
of	the	presentation	of	redness	to	S	in	the	specific	context	in	question.	
It	does	not itself bring	orangeness	into	the	mix	in	the	way	that	“perceiv-
ing	orangely”	or	“being	appeared	to	 in	orangeish	way”	does.	 Indeed,	
perceiving	in	a	way	associated	with	sodium	streetlights	has	no	intrin-
sic	connection	to	orangeness	at	all:	One	could	perceive	a	blue	car	and	
it	look	green	to	one	under	such	illumination	conditions.
5.4 Isn’t our view just a version of the Theory of Appearing?
Again,	no,	and	for	similar	reasons.	Consider	S’s	veridical	experience	
of	the	red	car	as	red.	According	to	the	Theory	of	Appearing,	the	color	
character	of	this	experience	is	to	be	understood	in	terms	of	a	relation	
between	S	and	the	car:	the	relation	of	“appearing	red”	(Langsam	1997:	
36).	But	what	about	Car	Case?	Well	here,	presumably,	the	proponent	
of	the	Theory	of	Appearing	will	hold	that	S	bears	a	different	relation	
to	the	car,	namely	that	of	“appearing	orange”.	Phenomenal	character	
is	 thus	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 ways of	 being	 related	 to	mind-inde-
pendent	objects,	appearing	red	being	one,	appearing	orange	another.	
17.	 In	holding	that	“ways	of	presentation”	are	shared	across	veridical	perceptions	
and	causally	matching	hallucinations,	Beck	attempts	to	reconcile	naïve	real-
ism	with	a	common	factor	approach	to	perceptual	experience.	We	deny	that	
hallucinations	can	be	given	any	such	positive	characterization	(Martin	2004).	
We	 also	 deny	Beck’s	 claim	 that	ways	 of	 presentation	 are	 completely	 deter-
mined	 by	 “neuro-computational	 properties”	 (625).	 Neuro-computational	
factors	may	figure	amongst	the	perspectival	factors	which	generate	different	
ways	of	perceiving.	But	 they	do	not	exhaust	such	 factors,	nor	exhaustively	
determine	such	ways.
S	senses	in	an	orange way.	Nothing	is presented	to	S which	is	constitu-
tive	of	the	character	of	S’s	experience	(Tye	1984:	196).	Rather,	the	ad-
verbialist	 replaces character-constituting	presented	elements	with	ad-
verbially-specified	ways	of	sensing.	In	appealing	to	ways	of	perceiving,	
we	are	absolutely	not	suggesting	that	they	replace character-constitut-
ing	presented	elements.	In	Car	Case,	if	we	stripped	away	the	present-
ed	elements,	no	experience	specifiable	simply	in	terms	of	the	way	of	
perceiving	in	question	will	be	left.	Ways	of	perceiving,	as	we	conceive	
of	them,	lack	such	independence	from	presented	elements.	They	are	
not	the	adverbialist’s	intransitive	ways	of	sensing,	but	transitive	ways	
of	being acquainted with character-constituting presented elements.	There	is	
no	such	thing	as	merely	perceiving	under	sodium	streetlights	(French	
2014:	411).16
Second,	 we	 reject	 the	 characterization	 of	 ways	 of	 perceiving	 in	
terms	of	the	perceptible	qualities	which	specify	the	character	of	the	ex-
perience	in	question.	We	deny,	for	instance,	that	there	is	such	a	thing	
as	an	orange	or	rectangular	way	of	perceiving,	or	a	way	of	perceiving	
orangely	or	rectangularly.	Rather,	we	specify	ways	of	perceiving	indi-
rectly by reference	to	perspectival	factors,	including	external	factors	
such	as	the	illumination	conditions,	and	internal	 factors	such	as	the	
perceptual	modality	involved	(and	even	structural	facts	about	percep-
tual	systems).
In	this	way,	we	diverge	from	Beck’s	(2019)	conception	of	“ways	of	
presentation”.	Unlike	the	adverbialist,	Beck	maintains	that	mind-inde-
pendent	presented	elements are	constitutive	of	character	(at	least	in	
veridical	experience).	However,	in	other	respects,	his	account	is	simi-
lar	 to	 the	adverbialist’s.	Beck	 thinks:	 (1)	 that	ways	are	 specifiable	 in	
terms	of	relevant	perceptible	qualities,	and	(2)	that	ways	make	an	en-
tirely	independent	contribution	to	character.	He	thus	holds	that	“you	
can	be	appeared	to	in	a	roundish	way	in	both	a	perception	and	in	a	
hallucination”	(627).
16.	 None	of	this	precludes	absences	counting	amongst	the	presented	elements	
of	experience	(Sorensen	2008).	To	perceive	an	absence	is	not	merely	to	per-
ceive	(Phillips	2013).
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not	conform	to	its	manner	of	presentation”	(2011:	173).	Here,	Johnston	
treats	the	ASE’s	manner	of	presentation	in	terms	of	a	perceptible	fea-
ture	(shape):
Think	of	an	innocent	looking	at	the	“bent”	pencil.	What	
makes	one	of	the	ASEs	he	is	enjoying	illusory	is	this:	the	
item	that	 is	 the	object	of	that	ASE,	e.g.,	 the	pencil,	 fails	
to	match	the	mode	of	presentation	that	is	constitutive	of	
the	ASE,	the	three-dimensional	curved-shape.	(2011:	195)
The	case	is	an	illusion	because	this	shape	mischaracterizes	the	ASE’s	
object:	“Token	ASEs	are	non-veridical	if	and	only	if	their	manners	of	
presentation	mischaracterize	 their	 objects;	 they	 are	 veridical	 if	 and	
only	 if	 their	manners	of	presentation	correctly	characterize	 their	ob-
jects”	(2014:	129).
In	contrast,	as	emphasized	above,	our	ways	of	perceiving	are	not	
specifiable	in	terms	of	perceptible	features.	Nor	do	they	characterize	
(or	mischaracterize)	the	objects	of	experience.	These	points	are	relat-
ed.	Our	ways	of	perceiving	are	not	characteristics.	The	way	of	perceiv-
ing	involved	in	Car	Case	is	perceiving	under sodium streetlights. There	is	
no	question	of	it	(figuring	in	experience	as)	characterizing	or	mischar-
acterizing	the	perceived	car,	nor	of	the	car	conforming	to	or	matching	
the	way	we	perceive	it.
At	this	 juncture,	we	have	said	a	great	deal	about	ways	of	perceiv-
ing.	Yet	we	have	left	unaddressed	an	important	question.	In	Car	Case,	
orangeness isn’t	 instantiated	 in	 the	environment	 that	S	perceives.	Yet	
the	car	looks	orange to	S.	So:
5.5 How does orangeness get into the picture? Why does the car look orange 
to S?
Orange	enters	the	adverbialist	picture	via	the	mode	of	sensing.	It	en-
ters	Beck’s	version	of	naïve	realism	via	his	independently	specifiable	
ways	 of	 presentation.	 It	 enters	 via	 the	 relation	 of	 appearing	 orange	
according	 to	 the	 Theory	 of	 Appearing.	 And	 it	 enters	 into	 the	man-
ner	 of	 presentation	on	 Johnston’s	 view.	But	 how	does	 our	 view	get	
These	ways	are	not	detachable	from	character-constituting	presented	
elements	 as	 the	 adverbialist’s	ways	 are.	They	 are	 relations	between	
subjects	and	the	mind-independent	objects	they	perceive.	Because	of	
this,	they	also	differ	from	Beck’s	ways;	they	are	not	present	in	cases	of	
hallucination	(Langsam	1997:	37−41).18
Nonetheless,	such	relations	of	appearing	are specifiable	in	terms	of	
perceptible	features,	and	so	differ	from	our	ways	of	perceiving.	In	Car	
Case,	the	proponent	of	the	Theory	of	Appearing	will	appeal	to	a	spe-
cific	way	of	being	related	to	the	car:	the	relation	of	appearing	orange. 
We	too	appeal	to	a	specific	way	of	being	related	to	the	car,	but	this	is	
not	the	relation	of	appearing	orange,	 it	 is	a	matter	of	perceiving	the	
car	in	such-and-such	circumstances,	i.e.	under sodium streetlights,	etc. To	
repeat,	perceiving	the	car	in	such	a	way	has	no	intrinsic	connection	to	
orangeness	at	all:	One	could	perceive	a	blue	car	and	it	look	green	to	
one	under	such	illumination	conditions.
Finally,	our	view	differs	from	the	view	proposed	recently	by	John-
ston	 (2011,	 2014),	which	he	 explicitly	 aligns	with	 the	Theory	 of	Ap-
pearing	(2011:	172).	Johnston	aims	to	give	an	account	of	what	he	calls	
“attentive	 sensory	 episodes”	 (ASEs),	 such	 as	S’s	 looking	 at	 a	 red	 car.	
Such	an	episode	not	only	involves	S	being	related	to	an	object	of	per-
ception,	but	what	Johnston	calls	a	“manner	of	presentation”.	Accord-
ing	 to	 Johnston,	we	perceive	 the	objects	of	ASEs	under	manners	of	
presentation.	And	episodes	which	involve	the	same	object	can	differ	
thanks	 to	a	difference	 in	manner	of	presentation.	 Johnston	even	ex-
ploits	such	manners	of	presentation	in	discussing	illusions.	One	might	
think,	then,	that	our	view	is	a	variant	of	Johnston’s.
However,	 there	 is	 a	 critical	 difference.	 In	 line	with	 adverbialists,	
Beck,	and	the	Theory	of	Appearing,	Johnston	understands	manners	of	
presentation	in	terms	of	perceptible	features.	Furthermore,	to	provide	
an	 account	 of	 illusions,	 Johnston	holds	 that	 an	 object	 “may	or	may	
18.	 As	a	result,	Langsam	adopts	a	disjunctivist	account	of	hallucinations.	Alston	
(1999:	191–192)	develops	his	theory	of	appearing	differently	by	claiming	that	
(certain)	hallucinations	are	relations	of	appearing	between	subjects	and	men-
tal images.
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to	orangeness.	Consequently,	the	car’s	orange	look	can	be	identified	
with	its	red	color	(cf.	Martin	2010:	215).20
Although	orangeness	 is	now	 in	 the	picture,	 it	 remains	 to	explain	
where	the	salient	subjective	similarity	arises	from.	Why,	under	sodium	
streetlights,	does	the	red	color	of	the	car	strike	S	as	being	more	like	be-
ing	orange	than	anything	else?	Of	course,	our	account	will	point	to	the 
way	in	which	the	car	and	its	redness	are	perceived.	But	the	explanato-
ry	demand	is	to	go	beyond	this	structural	characterization.	Why	does	
being	bathed	in	sodium	streetlight	mean	that	redness	is	perceived	in	
such	a	way	that	it	strikes	S	as	more	like	orange	than	its	actual	color?
Here	(and	despite	disagreeing	with	aspects	of	his	metaphysics	of	
looks),	Brewer’s	discussion	is	valuable.	According	to	Brewer,
visually	relevant	similarities	are	similarities	by	the	lights	
of	visual	processing	of	various	kinds.	Objects	have	visual-
ly	relevant	similarities	when	they	share	sufficiently	many	
common	properties	amongst	those	that	have	a	significant	
involvement	 in	 the	various	processes	underlying	vision.	
Thus,	and	very	crudely,	visually	relevant	similarities	are	
identities	 in	such	 things	as	 the	way	 in	which	 light	 is	 re-
flected	and	transmitted	from	the	objects	in	question,	and	
the	way	 in	which	 stimuli	 are	handled	by	 the	visual	 sys-
tem,	given	its	evolutionary	history	and	our	shared	train-
ing	during	development.	(2011:	103)
The	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realist	can	hold	that	under	sodium	street-
lights,	the	red	color	of	the	car	is	similar	in	some	of	the	above	respects	
to	a	paradigmatic	 instance	of	orangeness	 in	natural	daylight.	Specif-
ically,	 suppose	 (purely	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 illustration)	 that	 the	 car’s	
20.	A	consequence	of	this	parsimonious	view	is	that	the	red	car	has	an	orange	
look	even	 in	natural	daylight.	Objects	only	change	 their	appearance	when	
they	change	their	basic	visible	qualities.	This	may	seem	like	an	unattractive	
consequence	since	it	means	that	“the	car	looks	orange”	is	true	of	the	car	as	
it	is	in	natural	daylight.	Martin	argues	that	the	proponent	of	Parsimony	can	
meet	this	objection	by	explaining	why	“the	car	looks	orange”	is	not	assertible 
in	the	context	of	natural	daylight,	even	if	it	is	true	(218–222,	discussing	the	
bent	stick).
orangeness	into	the	picture,	given	that	we	explicitly	deny	that	ways	of	
perceiving	amount	to	“sensing	orangely”	or	similar?
To	address	this	question,	we	draw	on	Martin’s	(2010)	discussion	of	
looks	(especially	his	discussion	of	the	bent	stick,	195–222).	Following	
Martin,	the	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realist	can	say	that,	under	sodium	
streetlights,	the	car	has	a	feature	—	a	look	—	which	is	relevantly	similar	
to	the	paradigm	look	of	an	orange	thing.
What	are	looks?	If	looks	are	special	properties,	not	identifiable	with	
basic	visible	qualities,	then	though	we	haven’t	yet	said	that	they	are	
presented	elements,	we	are	 veering	 away	 from	 the	modesty	of	 Sim-
plicity	and	Austerity.	To	avoid	this,	we	claim	that	the	feature	of	the	car	
which	is	relevantly	similar	to	the	paradigm	look	of	an	orange	thing	just	
is	the	car’s	actual	color,	its	redness.	Moreover,	we	claim	that	the	para-
digm	look	of	an	orange	thing	simply	is	its	orangeness.	Thus,	the	car	
looks	orange	because	of	a	similarity	between	two	basic	visible	prop-
erties,	 viz.	 redness	 and	orangeness,	 a	 similarity	made	 salient	 in	 the	
relevant	conditions.	More	generally,	our	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realist	
appeals	to	Martin’s	Parsimonious account	of	looks,	on	which	looks	are	
simply	basic	visible	qualities:	“size,	shape,	colour,	visible	texture,	spa-
tial	arrangement	of	parts”	(2010:	207)		or	constructions	out	of	these.19
For	this	view	to	pass	muster,	the	car’s	red	color	must	be relevantly	
similar	 to	orangeness.	But	 in	what	way	 is	 redness	similar	 to	orange-
ness?	The	answer	is	that	in	the	circumstances	of	Car	Case,	the	subject	
looking	at	the	red	car	will	be	inclined	to	find	the	actual	color	of	the	
car	before	her	as	more	like	orangeness	than	anything	else.	Thus,	the	
psychological	impact	that	the	red	color	of	the	car	has	on	the	subject	in	
Car	Case	is	similar	to	the	psychological	impact	that	the	orange	color	
of	a	car	has	on	a	subject	who	sees	it	in	natural	daylight		a	paradig-
matic	 circumstance	 for	 encountering	 orangeness.	On	 such	 a	 subjec-
tive	measure	of	similarity,	the	red	color	of	the	car	is	relevantly	similar	
19.	 For	ease	of	exposition,	we	focus	just	on	the	car’s	color,	but	in	general,	the	look	
of	an	object	which	 is	 relevantly	similar	 to	 the	paradigm	 look	of	an	orange	
object	may	involve	a	more	complex	construction	out	of	its	basic	visible	prop-
erties.	Pointillist	paintings	arguably	provide	a	good	example	of	such	a	case.
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similarities	and	differences	with	paradigm	cases	of	perception.	To	un-
derstand	why	these	subjective	similarities	and	differences	obtain,	we	
will	 in	part	need	to	look	to	empirical	work	on	visual	processing	—	at	
psychological	and	neurophysiological	levels	of	explanation.
There	remains	one	final	challenge	to	confront.
1.6 Don’t we risk introducing a common factor into explanations of phenom-
enology which conflicts with the core commitments of naïve realism?
We	have	explained	why	 the	 red	 car	 looks	orange	by	appealing	 to	a	
similarity	 in	how	 redness	perceived	one	way	 strikes	us	 and	orange-
ness	perceived	another	strikes	us.	We	accounted	for	this	similarity	by	
appealing	to	the	similarity	of	proximal	input	to	our	visual	system.	But	
if	how	things	strike	us	 is	explicable	 in	 terms	of	something	common	
across	such	cases,	then	there	would	seem	to	be	pressure	to	positively	
characterize	 the	phenomenological	 situation	common	to	both	cases.	
For	 familiar	 reasons,	we	 are	 resistant	 to	 doing	 so	 (see	Martin	 2004,	
2006).
The	pressure	towards	a	common	factor	is	resistible.	To	see	this,	we	
need	to	remember	that	subjective	similarities	can	obtain	without	qual-
itative	identity.	Thus,	an	orange	car	perceived	in	daylight	and	a	red	car	
perceived	in	streetlight	may	elicit	similar	experiential	states	without	
those	states	being	qualitatively	identical.	In	particular,	the	naïve	realist	
will	insist	that	the	states	are	qualitatively	distinct	in	having	their	char-
acters	 partially	 grounded	 in	 orangeness	 in	 one	 case	 and	 redness	 in	
the	other.	Nonetheless,	they	are	similar	in	that	both	provoke	matching	
classificatory	inclinations.
Consider	a	specific	version	of	Car	Case	where	the	proximal	input	
is,	 by	 stipulation,	 exactly	 the	 same	under	 sodium	 illumination	 as	 it	
is	in	some	non-illusory	daylight	case.	Given	naturalistic	assumptions,	
such	a	case	will	involve	a	perceptual	state	which	is	not	knowably	not	
a	case	of	orange	car	seeing.	We	will	thus	have	an	experience	as	of	an	
orange	car	(given	the	treatment	of	experience	in	Martin	2004).	How-
ever,	there	is	no	pressure	here	to	characterize	the	experience	purely	
negatively	 (as	Martin	 argues	we	must	 characterize	 a	 corresponding	
redness	 is	a	matter	of	 its	having	a	certain	surface	reflectance	profile.	
And	suppose	that	the	product	of	the	interaction	of	sodium	streetlight	
with	this	profile	which	is	incident	at	the	retina	is	closely	matched	with	
the	product	of	the	interaction	of	natural	daylight	with	the	surface	re-
flectance	profile	of	a	paradigm	orange	object.	Because	of	this	match	in	
light	incident	at	the	retina,	the	redness	of	the	car	in	Car	Case	is	liable	
to	strike	S	as	more	like	orangeness	than	anything	else.
This	is	not	to	retract	what	we’ve	said	about	the	car’s	orange	look.	
The	car’s	orange	 look	 is	 simply	 its	 red	color	 (contra	Brewer).	This	 is	
relevantly	similar	to	orangeness	given	a	subjective	measure	of	similar-
ity.	What	Brewer	offers	us,	however,	 is	a	deeper	explanation	of	 this	
subjective	similarity:	of	why	the	car’s	redness	strikes	S	as	like	orange-
ness	when	perceived	under	sodium	streetlights.	In	general,	these	ex-
planations	will	be	piecemeal	and	highly	contingent	on	relevant	vision	
science.	Why	subjects	are	 inclined	 to	classify	 stimuli	as	 they	are,	as	
bent	despite	being	straight,	as	moving	when	still,	or	as	concave	when	
convex,	are	matters	for	empirical	investigation	and,	in	many	cases,	on-
going	controversy.	Our	aim	is	not	 to	provide	such	explanations,	but	
only	to	show	how	such	explanations	are	quite	consistent	with	Simple,	
Austere	Naïve	Realism.
We	can	pull	these	ideas	together	in	responding	to	the	reader	who	
asks	exactly	what	ways	of	perceiving	are	and	how	they	contribute	to	
phenomenal	character.	In	the	first	instance,	to	talk	of	ways	is	simply	to	
insist	 that	 there	 is	no	 function	 from	presented	elements	 to	phenom-
enal	characters.	This	is	essentially	a	structural	claim:	We	can	see	one	
and	the	same	scene	in	different	ways.	Nothing	more	informative	can	
be	said	about	ways	at	this	level	of	generality.	There	is	no	general	an-
swer	to	how	scenes	and	circumstances	of	perception	interact	to	settle	
the	way	the	scene	is	seen,	and	so	fix	character.	In	particular	cases	of	
perception,	however,	we	can	fruitfully	ask:	Why	does	the	way	in	which	
the	 subject	 perceives	 the	 scene	 affect	 the	 phenomenal	 character	 of	
their	experience	as	it	does?	Our	answer	here	will	advert	to	how	the	
various	elements	of	 the	scene	strike	the	subject,	given	the	way	they	
are	perceived	—	and	 in	particular,	 to	 the	visually	 relevant	 subjective	
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We	can	offer	a	parallel	defense	of	the	Difference	Principle:	Introspec-
tion	of	your	perceptual	experiences	 seems	 to	 reveal	only	aspects	of	
what	you	experience,	further	aspects	of	the	scenes,	as	presented.	Why?	
The	answer	is	that	your	perceptual	experiences	have	no	introspectible	
features	 over	 and	 above	 their	 character-constituting	 presented	 ele-
ments.	 So	 the	 phenomenal	 character	 of	 such	 experiences	 is	wholly	
constituted	by	their	presented	elements.22
Tye’s	introspective	claim	is	notoriously	controversial.	Nonetheless,	
in	the	present	context,	a	more	concessive	reply	is	available.	For	the	na-
ïve	realist	can	agree	with	the	following	transparency	thesis:	Introspec-
tion	 of	 your	 perceptual	 experience	 inevitably	 involves	 attention	 to	
presented	elements.	After	all,	the	naïve	realist	can	happily	allow	that	
all	aspects	of	experience	are	scene-involving,	being	relations	between	
subjects	and	presented	elements	(Soteriou	2013:	88).	What	the	naïve	
realist	who	rejects	the	Difference	Principle	must	deny	is	that	aspects	
of	a	scene	can	only	be	perceived	in	one	way.	However,	it	 is	obscure	
how	transparency	considerations	could	establish	such	a	strong	claim.	
How	could	the	fact	that	introspective	reflection	inevitably	lands	upon	
aspects	of	the	presented	scene	establish	that	such	aspects	could	only	
shape	conscious	character	in	one	way?
Debates	about	transparency	and	intentionalism	standardly	pit	the	
pure	intentionalist	against	the	believer	in	qualia	or	mental	paint.	Their	
dispute	is	said	to	represent	the	“greatest	chasm	in	the	philosophy	of	
mind”	(Block	1996:	19).	Here,	“mental	paint”	refers	to	intrinsic	proper-
ties	of	experiences	 in	virtue	of	which	they	represent	externalia.	The	
dispute	between	transparency	and	qualia	theorists	concerns	whether	
we	are	aware	of	any	such	features.	The	naïve	realist	conceives	of	per-
ception	as	an	essentially	relational	phenomenon.	As	a	result,	they	will	
eschew	mental	paint	so	conceived	(Campbell	2009:	659).	Nonetheless,	
there	is	a	weaker,	more	general	notion	of	mental	paint	which	qualia	
theorists	also	employ	and	in	relation	to	which	they	occupy	common	
ground	with	the	Difference	Principle-denying	naïve	realist.	According	
22.	 Strictly,	this	last	claim	is	stronger	than	our	minimal,	modal	formulation	of	the	
Difference	Principle.
hallucination).	 For	we	 can	positively	 characterize	 the	 state	 in	 terms	
of	the	red	car	seen	in	a	certain	(sodium	street-lit)	way.	It	is	true	that	
we	have	the	same	experience	across	these	veridical	and	illusory	cases.	
But	as	is	familiar	from	disjunctivist	approaches	to	hallucination,	such	
experiences	do	not	constitute	a	fundamental	experiential	kind.	Rather,	
the	experience	in	one	case	will	be	fundamentally	one	of	seeing	a	red	
car	in	sodium	light,	the	experience	in	the	other	case	will	be	fundamen-
tally	one	of	seeing	an	orange	car	in	daylight.21
6. Arguments for the Difference Principle
Rejecting	the	Difference	Principle	is	a	coherent	and	attractive	strategy	
for	the	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realist.	However,	it	remains	to	consider	
whether	anything	might	be	 said	 in	 favor	of	 it.	 In	 the	absence	of	 ex-
plicit	arguments	in	the	literature,	we	offer	two	arguments	inspired	by	
standard	defenses	of	pure	intentionalism:	the	view	that	phenomenal	
character	supervenes	on	(or	is	determined	by,	or	even	identical	with)	
representational	content.	We	also	identify	a	third	epistemic	argument	
for	a	principle	close	to	the	Difference	Principle.	These	arguments	may	
explain	why	some	naïve	realists	cleave	to	the	principle.	Their	failure	
frees	them	to	reject	it.
The	most	familiar	consideration	adduced	in	support	of	pure	inten-
tionalism	is	the	so-called	transparency	of	experience.	Thus,	Tye:
[I]ntrospection	of	your	perceptual	experiences	seems	to	
reveal	 only	 aspects	 of	 what	 you	 experience,	 further	 as-
pects	of	the	scenes,	as	represented.	Why?	The	answer,	I	
suggest,	 is	 that	your	perceptual	experiences	have	no	 in-
trospectible	features	over	and	above	those	implicated	in	
their	intentional	contents.	So	the	phenomenal	character	
of	 such	 experiences	 …	 is	 identical	 with,	 or	 contained	
within,	their	intentional	contents.	(1995:	136)
21.	 We	do	not	mean	here	to	take	a	stand	on	whether	experience	presents	high-
level	categories	such	as	carhood.	A	reader	disinclined	towards	this	view	can	
think	of	the	fundamental	kind	as	seeing	a	red	car-sized	and	shaped	object	in	
sodium	light,	and	seeing	an	orange	car-sized	and	shaped	object	in	daylight.
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experience	without	a	difference	in	presented elements.	The	Difference	
Principle	follows.
Byrne	 focuses	on	defending	his	argument’s	first	claim,	 taking	his	
second	 claim	 to	be	obvious.	Thus,	 “Premise	B”	of	Byrne’s	 argument	
runs:
Assume	that	a	subject	enjoys	an	experience	e	that	ends	at	
t	and	then	experience	e*,	and	that	after t	the	subject	no-
tices	a	change	in	phenomenal	character,	solely	on	the	ba-
sis	of	her	current	experience	e*	and	the	(perfect)	memory	
produced	by	her	past	experience	e.	Then	the	way	things	
seem	 to	 the	 subject	when	she	enjoys	 e	differs	 from	 the	
way	things	seem	when	she	enjoys	e*.	That	is,	the	content	
of	e	differs	from	the	content	of	e*.	(210)
Here,	in	the	final	step	(as	elsewhere),	Byrne	simply	equates	the	way	
things	seem	when	a	subject	is	enjoying	her	experience	with	the	con-
tent	of	that	experience.	Opponents	of	pure	intentionalism	will	likely	
balk.
Byrne’s	 “Premise	 B”	 has	 a	 natural	 naïve	 realist	 analogue:	 Simply	
replace	 “content”	 by	 “character-constituting	 presented	 elements”	 in	
the	final	sentence.	Analogously,	this	argument	simply	assumes	that	if	
there	is	a	difference	between	two	experiences	in	the	ways	things	seem	
to	 their	 subjects,	 there	must	 be	 a	 difference	 in	 presented	 elements.	
Here,	 the	Difference	Principle-denying	naïve	 realist	will	balk,	 for	 to	
assume	this	is	not	to	argue	for	the	Difference	Principle,	but	bluntly	to	
assert	it.
Lastly,	we	consider	an	explicit	defense	by	a	naïve	realist	of	a	princi-
ple	close	to	the	Difference	Principle.	Kalderon	(2008)	considers	a	case	
of	color	perception	in	which	a	normal	perceiver,	Norm,	sees	a	garment	
(say	some	red	trousers)	in	two	different	lighting	conditions.	Because	
of	metamerism,	in	the	fluorescent	storelight,	Norm	cannot	tell	which	
of	two	reds	the	trousers	are.	Bringing	them	into	daylight,	he	comes	to	
know	which.	(Whilst	not	a	case	of	 illusion,	 the	structure	of	 the	case	
parallels	one	in	which	the	store	 illumination	does	elicit	an	illusion.)	
to	this	weaker	notion,	to	believe	in	mental	paint	is	simply	to	believe	
that	“representationally	identical	experiences	might	be	phenomenally	
different”	 (Block	 1996:	 548).	The	Difference	Principle-denying	naïve	
realist	will	agree	that	there	is	mental	paint	in	this	minimal	sense.	As	
they	will	put	the	thought:	Experiences	can	be	phenomenally	different	
despite	sharing	precisely	the	same	presented	elements.
Far	 from	being	confounded	by	 transparency	considerations,	 then,	
the	Difference	Principle-denying	naïve	realist	offers	a	happy	compro-
mise	between	those	on	either	side	of	Block’s	great	chasm.	For	on	the	
one	hand,	our	naïve	realist	can	agree	with	Tye	that	transparency	tells	
against	our	being	aware	of	intrinsic	(i.e.	non-relational)	features	of	our	
experience.	On	the	other	hand,	our	naïve	realist	can	agree	with	Block	
that	 there	are	differences	 in	phenomenal	character	which	do	not	 in-
volve	differences	in	the	presented	scene.23
Byrne	 (2001)	 offers	 a	 second	 well-known	 argument	 for	 pure	 in-
tentionalism.	Byrne’s	argument	distils	to	two	simple	claims:	first,	that	
there	cannot	be	a	change	in	the	phenomenal	character	of	someone’s	
experience	without	 a	 change	 in	 the	way	 the	world	 seems	 to	 them;	
second,	that	there	cannot	be	a	change	in	the	way	the	world	seems	to	
someone	in	experience	without	a	difference	in	representational	con-
tent.24	It	follows	that	there	can	be	no	changes	in	phenomenal	character	
without	corresponding	changes	in	representational	content.	Again,	we	
can	convert	 this	argument	 into	an	argument	 for	 the	Difference	Prin-
ciple.	The	first	claim	remains	unaltered.	The	second	claim	becomes:	
There	cannot	be	a	change	in	the	way	the	world	seems	to	someone	in	
23.	Much	 ink	 has	 been	 spilt	 debating	 putative	 counter-examples	 to	 pure	 in-
tentionalism	 (e.g.	 Peacocke	 1983,	 Tye	 1995:	 155–159).	 Some	 intentionalist	
responses	 to	 such	putative	 counter-examples	parallel	ways	 in	which	naïve	
realists	such	as	Fish	and	Genone	have	sought	to	block	arguments	from	illu-
sion	(e.g.	Tye	2002:	453	on	the	representation	of	viewpoint-relative	size).	The	
possibility	of	making	such	moves	in	either	case	makes	the	counter-example	
strategy	appear	unpromising.	Nonetheless,	we	are	sympathetic	to	many	such	
counter-examples.	They	reveal	how	strong	and	unnatural	an	assumption	the	
Difference	Principle	is.
24.	 See	further	Thau	2002:	30–33,	and	also	Siegel	2012:	chpt.	2.
	 craig	french	&	ian	phillips Austerity and Illusion
philosophers’	imprint	 –		16		– vol.	20,	no.	??	(february	2020)
Kalderon’s	 argument	 closely	 resembles	 a	 very	 widely	 held	 view	
about	perception	and	consciousness,	given	voice	by	Byrne	in	the	fol-
lowing	passage.
Accounts	of	phenomenal	character	divide	on	a	fault	line	
between	 presentationalists	 and	 sensationalists.	 Presen-
tationalists	 think	 that	 phenomenal	 character	 is	 solely	
a	 matter	 of	 the	 subject’s	 awareness	 (or	 better, ostensible 
awareness)	of	his	environment.	…	According	 to	presen-
tationalists,	 th[e]	presented	 segment	of	 reality	fixes	 the	
phenomenal	 character	 of	 [one’s]	 experience.	 …	 Sensa-
tionalists	deny	that	this	is	all	there	is	to	phenomenal	char-
acter.	They	usually	base	their	case	on	alleged	examples	
where	the	presented	segment	of	reality	remains	constant	
while	phenomenal	character	changes.	…
If	 sensationalism	 is	 true,	 then	 the	 phenomenal	 char-
acter	of	an	experience	can	to	some	extent	float	free	from	
the	 segment	 of	 reality	 the	 experience	 (ostensibly)	 pres-
ents,	and	so	its	relevance	to	the	epistemic	status	of	beliefs	
about	that	segment	is	entirely	unclear.	This	is	why	Smith-
ies,	a	prominent	defender	of	 the	epistemic	 relevance	of	
phenomenal	character,	writes	that:
It	 is	 because	 perceptual	 experience	 has	 the	 phe-
nomenal	character	of	confronting	one	with	objects	
and	properties	in	the	world	around	me	that	it	justi-
fies	forming	beliefs	about	those	objects	and	prop-
erties.	(2014:	103).	(Byrne	2016:	956−957;	emphasis	
in	original)
relation	 to	 that	 content”	 (301).	Without	 commitment	 to	 there	 being	 confi-
dence	relations,	our	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realist	will	agree	with	Munton	
here	that	the	same	scene	can	be	experienced	in	different	ways,	some	placing	
us	in	stronger	epistemic	positions	than	others.	That	said,	Morrison’s	develop-
ment	of	a	closely	related	view	on	which	“some	veridical	experiences	involve	
relations	to	objects	that	are	absent	(or	even	non-existent)”	(2016:	44)	is	plain-
ly	inimical	to	naïve	realism.
Unusually,	Kalderon	explicitly	countenances	the	idea	of	rejecting	the	
Difference	Principle:	“Perhaps	the	way	something	is	presented	in	ex-
perience,	as	well	as	what’s	presented,	can	make	for	a	phenomenal	dif-
ference”	 (2008:	 955).	Moreover,	 he	denies	 that	we	 can	 conclusively	
establish	“the	general	claim	that	a	difference	in	the	phenomenal	char-
acter	of	experience	suffices	for	a	difference	in	what	is	present	in	that	
experience”	(956;	see	also	2011b:	241).	Nonetheless,	he	insists	that	we	
should	not	understand	the	case	of	Norm	in	terms	of	variation	in	the	
way	one	and	the	same	color	 is	presented.	 Instead,	we	must	think	of	
Norm	as	 seeing	different	 aspects	of	 the	 color	 in	 the	 two	conditions	
(as	discussed	above,	and	in	conformity	with	the	Difference	Principle).	
Why?
[T]he	 phenomenal	 difference	 between	 Norm’s	 colour	
experience	 in	 the	 shop	and	 in	daylight	must	be	due	 to	
presentational	difference	if	it	is	to	have	the	positive	epis-
temic	 significance	 it	must	 have	 if	 on	 the	basis	 of	 these	
phenomenally	distinct	experiences	Norm	could	come	to	
know	which	colour	he	is	perceiving.	(2008:	956)	
What	 is	 obscure	 here	 is	 why	 only	 presentational	 differences	 could	
yield	 “positive	 epistemic	 significance”.	 Suppose,	 pace	 Kalderon,	 that	
the	phenomenal	difference	between	storelight	and	daylight	is	a	matter	
of	the	way	Norm	perceives	the	garment’s	color	as	a	result	of	the	pre-
vailing	 illumination	conditions.	Why	should	this	mean	that	 the	epis-
temic	difference	between	Norm’s	situations	in	and	out	of	the	store	can-
not	be	captured?	Why	can’t	it	be	that	in	some	illumination	conditions	
(perceiving	the	garment	one	way),	Norm	is	able	to	know	which	color	
it	is,	whereas	in	others,	he	is	not?	Perhaps	some	ways	of	perceiving	are	
epistemically	superior	to	others,	enabling	us	to	know	more	precisely	
what	is	presented	to	us	(cf.	Brewer	2018:	§5).25
25.	 Compare	 recent	 discussions	 of	 perceptual	 confidence.	Munton	 (2016),	 for	
example,	considers	a	pair	of	cases	in	which	a	subject	is	confronted	with	the	
same	scene	in	and	out	of	fog.	She	argues	that	the	subject’s	differential	epis-
temic	standing	derives	from	a	difference	in	experience	best	explained	by	the	
hypothesis	that	“visual	states	comprise	not	only	a	content,	but	a	confidence	
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the Representational View of Experience.	New	York:	OUP.
Byrne,	 Alex	 (2001).	 “Intentionalism	 Defended”.	 The Philosophical Re-
view	110(2):	199–240.	
—	(2016).	 “The	 Epistemic	 Significance	 of	 Experience”.	 Philosophical 
Studies	173(4):	947–967.	
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—	(2009).	“Consciousness	and	Reference”.	The Oxford Handbook of Phi-
losophy of Mind.	 Brian	 P.	 McLaughlin,	 Ansgar	 Beckermann,	 and	
Sven	Walter	(eds).	Oxford:	OUP,	648–662.
Campbell,	 John	and	Cassam,	Quassim	(2014).	Berkeley’s Puzzle: What 
Does Experience Teach Us?	Oxford:	OUP.
Crane,	Tim	and	French,	Craig	(2016).	“The	Problem	of	Perception”.	The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.	E.	Zalta	(ed).	Spring	2016.
Fish,	 William	 (2009).	 Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion.	 Oxford:	
OUP.
Foster,	John	(2000).	The Nature of Perception.	Oxford:	OUP.
French,	Craig	 (2014).	 “Naïve	Realist	Perspectives	on	Seeing	Blurrily”.	
Ratio	27(4):	393–413.
French,	Craig	and	Walters,	Lee	(2018).	“The	Invalidity	of	the	Argument	
from	Illusion”.	American Philosophical Quarterly	55(4):	357–364.
Genone,	 James	 (2014).	 “Appearance	 and	 Illusion”.	 Mind	 123(490):	
339–376.
Johnston,	Mark	(2006).	“Better	than	Mere	Knowledge?	The	Function	
of	Sensory	Awareness”.	Perceptual Experience.	Tamar	Szabo	Gendler	
and	John	Hawthorne	(eds).	Oxford:	OUP,	260–290.	
—	(2011).	“On	a	Neglected	Epistemic	Virtue”.	Philosophical Issues.	21(1):	
165–218.	
—	(2014).	“The	Problem	with	the	Content	View”.	Does Perception Have 
Content? Berit	Brogaard	(ed).	New	York:	OUP,	105–137.
In	this	passage,	Byrne	conflates	two	critically	different	ideas.	First,	that	
“phenomenal	character	is	solely	a	matter	of	the	subject’s	awareness	(or	
better,	 ostensible awareness)	 of	 his	 environment”.	 Second,	 that	 phe-
nomenal	character	is	fixed	simply	by	the	segment	of	reality	a	subject	
is	aware	of.	As	discussed	at	length,	the	first	claim	does	not	entail	the	
second.	The	Difference	Principle	 can	be	 rejected.	Once	 this	 is	 seen,	
the	epistemic	objection	to	the	idea	of	phenomenal	variation	despite	
an	unchanging	presented	scene	lapses.	For	whilst	understanding	such	
changes	in	terms	of	features	(splotches	of	mental	paint	or	sensation)	
which	“float	free”	from	reality	understandably	induces	epistemic	anxi-
ety,	understanding	such	changes	in	terms	of	the	different	ways	reality	
can	present	itself	does	not.	It	is	quite	consistent	with	Smithies’	thought	
that	only	experience	with	the	phenomenal	character	of	confrontation	
can	have	epistemic	bearing.
Three	potential	considerations	in	favor	of	the	Difference	Principle	
have	been	found	wanting.	Absent	stronger	arguments,	the	naïve	real-
ist	should	feel	no	compunction	in	discarding	it.	So	unburdened,	the	
naïve	realist	is	freed	to	endorse	a	particularly	simple	account	of	both	
veridical	perception	and	illusion:	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism.
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